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Abstract 
Real effective exchange rate volatility is examined for 90 countries using monthly 
data from January 1990 to June 2006.  Volatility decreases with openness to 
international trade and per capita GDP, and increases with inflation, particularly 
under a horizontal peg or band, and with terms-of-trade volatility.  The choice of 
exchange rate regime matters.  After controlling for these effects, a free float adds at 
least 45 % to the standard deviation of the real effective exchange rate, relative to a 
conventional peg, but most other regimes make little difference.  The results are 
robust to alternative volatility measures and to sample selection bias. 
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1. Introduction 
What makes currencies volatile? The empirical analysis of real exchange rate volatility is 
a relatively neglected area, even though the topic has long been a concern for academics 
and policy-makers.
1  Although volatility is known to be higher in economies with a low 
ratio of international trade to GDP and with lower per capita income (e.g. Bravo-Ortega 
and di Giovanni, 2006), we lack systematic studies of a large number of countries, or 
quantitative estimates of how much volatility can be reduced by various forms of 
intervention. 
 
One strand of investigation in previous research has compared volatility in the advanced 
countries under the Bretton Woods system and subsequently.  The clear conclusion is that 
real exchange rate volatility has increased, even though other dimensions of 
macroeconomic volatility have not (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Flood and Rose, 1995; 
Mussa, 1986; Rose, 1996), a phenomenon identified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) as 
one of the six major puzzles of macroeconomics.  Using a century of data for real 
exchange rate volatility against the US dollar for the UK, Canada, Japan and France, 
Hasan and Wallace (1996) also find significantly greater volatility under floating rates. 
 
These findings suggest that the exchange rate regime matters.  It may, however, matter 
less than this implies if many of a country’s trading partners are floating against one 
                                                           
1 Academics have debated whether real exchange rate volatility adversely affects trade and growth (e.g. 
Aghion et al., 2006; Clark et al., 2004).  Policy-makers seem very reluctant to allow exchange rates to fluctuate 
freely (under 15 % of countries currently do so according to the IMF), and frequently complain about them 
when they do allow them to do so.   3
another, as is currently the case.  In these circumstances, a single-currency peg may not 
achieve much greater stability than a float, and a basket peg that better reflects the pattern 
of countries’ trade may achieve greater real effective exchange rate stability than a single-
currency peg.  It is also very much of an open question how much volatility can be 
reduced by managing a float.  This is the type of issue that we investigate. 
 
There are some studies of exchange rate volatility in cross-country samples.  Devereux 
and Lane (2003) examine monthly nominal bilateral exchange rate volatility in a large 
sample of country pairs over the period 1995 to 2000, and find volatility to be negatively 
related to trade flows, business cycle asymmetry, financial development and external 
debt, and positively related to the product of the countries’ GDP.  Hau (2002) reports real 
effective exchange rate volatility to be negatively related to the ratio of trade to GDP. 
Bravo-Ortega and di Giovanni (2006) find volatility to be negatively related to trade 
openness and per capita GDP, and positively related to trade taxes and an index of 
remoteness (trade-weighted distance from the rest of the world).   They conclude that 
trade costs (transport costs plus taxes) raise volatility.  Hausmann et al. (2006) focus on 
the much higher real effective exchange rate volatility of developing countries in annual 
data over the period 1980-2000.  They find that the difference cannot be explained by the 
greater variance of terms-of-trade shocks. 
 
One variable that has not featured in these studies is inflation.  We show that, even at low 
to medium levels, inflation is quite important for real effective exchange rate volatility,   4




A distinctive feature of the present study is that we seek to identify the influence of the 
exchange rate regime in some detail.  We use the IMF’s current de facto methodology for 
identifying regimes.  We then measure real effective exchange rate volatility over periods 
when there are no regime switches.  This inevitably means that the episodes over which 
volatility is measured are of unequal length, but we show by experimenting with 
alternative minimum lengths that this makes little difference to the results.  We also test 
the robustness of the results by using several different measures of volatility and by 
varying the threshold above which high-inflation observations are excluded.  We use a 
sample of 90 countries over the period 1990-2006.
3  We show that regime effects are 
important and provide a quantitative estimate of them. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  After an informal theoretical 
discussion in Section 2, the different volatility measures are presented in Section 3.   
Section 4 discusses the classification system for exchange rate regimes.  After some 
preliminary data analysis in Section 5, the main empirical results are presented in Section 




                                                           
2 Hau (2002) and Rose (1996) are two studies that do allow for regime effects.   5
2.  Theoretical Considerations 
The micro-founded models currently popular in international macroeconomics assume 
monopolistically competitive firms and incorporate downward-sloping demand functions 
for a country’s goods in international markets (e.g. Bergin, 2006).  It is a natural step 
from there to the concept of an equilibrium real exchange rate, to which the actual rate 
tends to revert.  At the equilibrium, net trade will be at a value that, after adding net 
property income flows, will be consistent with a medium-run equilibrium in the current 
account balance.  This is not a full stock equilibrium, because the country will normally 
be accumulating or losing net external assets, which will impart some trend to net 
property income flows and therefore to the equilibrium level of net trade and the real 
exchange rate. The medium-run equilibrium in the current account balance will reflect the 
savings and investment propensities of the country, which in turn will be influenced by its 
level of development, demographics, the fiscal balance and institutional and other 
characteristics (see Williamson and Mahar, 1998, for a fuller discussion). More formally, 
let (the logarithm of) the real exchange rate (REER) consist of an equilibrium (EQU) and 
a disequilibrium component (DIS): 
 
  REER = EQU + DIS         ( 1 )  
 
The relationship between the current account balance (CA) and the real exchange rate is a 
function of factors such as net foreign assets (NFA), the terms of trade (TOT), the level of 
aggregate demand in the economy (Y) and trade policy (POL): 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
3 Data for regime classifications using the IMF’s current methodology are not available before 1990.   6
 
  CA = f(REER, NFA, TOT, Y, POL)        ( 2 )  
 
This equation can be inverted, for CA set at its trend level,CA, to solve for the 
equilibrium real exchange rate: 
 
  ) , , , , (
1 POL Y TOT NFA CA f EQU
− =        ( 3 )  
 
Barisone et al. (2006) provide evidence from six major countries that the actual rate 
reverts towards an equilibrium that is estimated using this approach.  The variance of the 
real effective exchange rate is given by: 
 
 var(REER) = var(EQU) + var(DIS) + 2 cov(EQU, DIS)     (4) 
 
The variance of the equilibrium component will reflect the variance of the factors shown 
in equation (3), of which we now provide an informal discussion. For example a country 
that is poor in capital might undertake major reforms to address institutional problems 
that were previously inhibiting capital inflows, thus appreciating its equilibrium real 
exchange rate. The covariance term captures how disequilibrium movements in the real 
exchange rate might affect the equilibrium itself.  For example, a real exchange rate 
appreciation reduces the domestic currency price of imports; with quantitative controls on 
imports, this raises the tariff equivalent of the quantitative controls, thus effectively   7
tightening trade policy and pulling the equilibrium real exchange rate towards the actual 
one, implying a positive covariance.  With net foreign assets the effect can work in either 




The variance of the disequilibrium component is likely to reflect different factors.  Bravo-
Ortega and di Giovanni (2006) show theoretically that country-specific productivity 
shocks have larger real exchange rate effects in more closed economies because of 
greater geographical and artificial obstacles to trade adjustment.  The intuition is that 
country-specific shocks change the relative price of non-tradeables across countries more 
than the relative price of tradeables.  Hau (2002) suggests that less open economies have 
more volatile real exchange rates because nominal exchange rate shocks have smaller 
import price effects. When currencies are viewed as assets, their volatility under floating 
is likely to be determined by the range over which there is no clear evidence of 
misalignment.  Bleaney (2008) shows that this implies greater volatility if the ratio of 
international trade to GDP is smaller, because of the tendency to use GDP as the 
denominator in defining long-run current account sustainability.
5 
 
The exchange rate regime is potentially an important determinant of the disequilibrium 
component of volatility.  In a target zone, for example, the authorities’ intervention policy 
                                                           
4 In richer countries, where liabilities tend to be denominated in domestic currency, an appreciation tends to 
worsen the net asset position, whereas in poorer countries, with liabilities denominated in foreign currency and 
liabilities exceeding assets, it tends to improve it (Lane and Shambaugh, 2007). The covariance would thus 
tend to be negative for richer countries and positive for poorer ones.   8
may co-ordinate mean-reverting speculative activity that might otherwise be outweighed 
by momentum traders (Reitz and Taylor, 2008).  An important caveat is that this is only 
likely to be true if the equilibrium rate is within, or not far outside, the target zone.  If the 
authorities are trying to maintain an exchange rate that is significantly away from its 
equilibrium value, an exercise which is futile in the long run, their interventions in the 
foreign exchange market may actually increase volatility.  For example, policy-makers 
may attach some value to nominal exchange rate stability (and to stability against some 
particular currency rather than against a trade-weighted average), and allow some real 
appreciation in the presence of inflation.  This ultimately has to be corrected, and implies 
that real exchange rate volatility under some forms of exchange rate management may 
increase with the inflation rate.  Frankel (2005) shows that finance ministers are more 
likely to lose their jobs after a devaluation.  This provides a rationale for the assumption, 
frequently made in currency crisis models, that there is a fixed cost of adjusting a peg.  If 
true, this imparts a significant element of nominal rigidity to a pegged rate system.  More 
generally, inflation creates a tension between nominal and real exchange rate stability.  
Certainly high-inflation episodes are characterised by exceptionally high real exchange 
rate volatility (Bleaney, 1996, Table 1; Gonzaga and Terra, 1997), although these could 
perhaps be dismissed as exceptional cases.  Thus the effect of exchange rate intervention 
on the disequilibrium component of real exchange rate volatility can operate in both 
directions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
5 This argument assumes that the elasticity of trade flows with respect to real exchange rate movements is 
similar across countries, so that a given real exchange rate movement has a larger impact on the trade balance 
as a proportion of GDP in more open economies.    9
By including exchange rate regime dummies along with structural and other variables in 
our volatility regression, we attempt to control for the disequilibrium as well the 
equilibrium components of volatility. 
 
3.  Measurement of Volatility 
We consider four different ways to measure volatility, all based on the log of the real 
effective exchange rate index as given in International Financial Statistics.  The four 
measures are (1) the mean absolute monthly change (MAC); (2) the standard deviation of 
monthly changes (SDC); (3) the root mean square monthly change (RMSC); and the 
standard deviation of the level (SDL), all multiplied by 100 so that the numbers 
approximate to percentages.  Formally, if xt is the log real effective exchange rate index 
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Of these, MAC yields the lowest numbers, because it attaches less weight to big changes 
than SDC, while RMSC is in effect a standard deviation about zero rather than about the   10
mean change, and therefore takes account of drift.  It differs from SDC only by the square 
of the mean change, which is small in many cases.  Finally, SDL is the standard deviation 
of the level about the estimated sample mean, and will reflect the cumulative effect of 
monthly changes, including their persistence and any tendency to mean-reversion, as well 
as their absolute size.  It is difficult to say a priori which is the best measure, because it 
depends on the time horizon and on the similarity of the time series properties of the 
series.  Certainly firms investing in trading relationships or productive assets are likely to 
be more worried about how far the real exchange rate might move over a longer period, 
such as several years, rather than one month.  Although this argument suggests SDL as 
the best measure, this might not be true under certain stringent conditions.  If the real 
effective exchange rate series of different countries have very similar time series 
properties, then a measure based on changes should be less noisy because it is less 
dependent on particular shock realisations (since the stochastic element is cumulated in a 
levels measure).
6  This is a strong assumption to make, however, particularly since the 
exchange rate regime is likely to affect the time series properties of the real exchange 





                                                           
6 In previous work SDC and SDL have been the most commonly used measures. Suppose that in each country 
(i), the relevant equation is:  Δxt = ai + biΔxt-1 – cixt-1 + uit, where u is a random error, and ai, bi and ci are 
parameters that are fixed for each country.  If a, b and c are identical across countries, but the variance of ui is 
not, in the long run the variance of x should be proportional to the variance of ui, and the variance of ui is best 
estimated from changes in x.  If the parameters vary across countries, the ratio of variances of x in different   11
4.  Exchange Rate Regime Classifications 
The IMF has always published information about the exchange rate regimes of its 
member countries.  Unfortunately, until 1997, this was simply based on the countries’ 
own classification of their regime, which was sometimes inaccurate.  Because of this, 
since 1999, the IMF has published its own classification of a country’s regime, as 
described in Table 1.  Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) provide a revised classification for 
earlier years back to 1990 on the same principles.  This is the data set that we use.
7  
Alternative historical classifications, based on different statistical methodologies, have 
been provided by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and 
Shambaugh (2004).  Unfortunately, these disagree with each other as much as with 
countries’ own reported classifications (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007).  Two of them are 
in any case unsuitable for our present purposes since they only generate one classification 
for each calendar year.  More generally, statistical procedures have limitations, and it 
would be difficult to claim that they are superior to the IMF’s current methodology (the 
motivation for developing these alternative measures was the weaknesses in the old IMF 
procedure rather than in the new one).  Indeed, since the volatility of the nominal 
exchange rate is an important ingredient of all statistically-based classification schemes, a 
statistical approach carries a significant risk of endogeneity bias with respect to real 
exchange rate volatility.  This risk should be smaller, although probably not entirely 
absent, with a judgemental approach such as that currently used by the IMF.  We 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
countries will also reflect different values of a, b and c, which will only be captured in SDL.  We show below 
that we get similar results whatever measure we use. 
7 We are grateful to Harald Anderson of the IMF for providing the data.   12
therefore confine our analysis to the period covered by the IMF’s current procedures, as 
backdated by Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002). 
 
Table 1.  Regime Classifications 
1  No separate legal tender 
2 Currency  board  arrangements 
3  Conventional fixed pegs 
4 Horizontal  bands 
5 Crawling  pegs 
6 Crawling  bands 
7 Managed  float 
8 Independent  float 
Notes.  No separate legal tender includes currency unions as well as the use of a foreign currency as legal 
tender.  Categories 3 and 5 are defined by a maximum fluctuation of ±1% around the central parity; a wider 
range is classified in category 4 or 6, as appropriate.  In categories 5 and 6 the central parity is adjusted 
relatively frequently by small amounts.  Category 7 covers cases where the monetary authority attempts to 




There is a choice to be made between measuring real exchange rate volatility in periods 
of fixed length, across all countries, even though there may have been a switch of 
exchange rate regime during the period, and measuring it over periods characterised by 
the same exchange rate regime, which will necessarily be of unequal length.  We choose 
the latter option.  To deal with the problem of varying episode length, in the empirical 
analysis we exclude episodes where the regime lasted for too short a time (less than four 
quarters), and we also split exceptionally long periods of the same regime into two or 
three shorter episodes.  This helps to prevent countries with few regime switches from 
being too severely underrepresented.  Any period of 48 quarters is split into three 
episodes of equal or nearly equal length, and any period of between 32 and 47 quarters is   13
split into two episodes of equal or nearly equal length.  Each episode thus defined 
represents an observation in the empirical analysis that follows.  Thus, for the United 
States, which has been freely floating throughout, there are three 22-quarter episodes, 
lasting respectively from January 1990 to June 1995, July 1995 to December 2000, and 
January 2001 to June 2006, with real exchange rate volatility measured separately over 
each of these three episodes, each of which represents an observation in the regressions 
that follow.  For some other countries, there are more than three episodes of shorter 
average length.  By increasing the cut-off point for the minimum length of an episode to 
be included in the analysis, we can check that the inclusion of more episodes from some 
countries than others is not affecting the results. 
 
5.  Preliminary Data Analysis 
In order to avoid the influence of outliers, all episodes where the mean monthly change in 
the logarithm of the consumer price index is greater than 0.03 (equivalent to an annual 
inflation rate of 43.33%) are excluded, as are those containing fewer than four quarters.   
This reduces the observations from 330 to 274.  Table 2 provides some basic statistical 
data for this sample.  The mean absolute monthly change in the real exchange rate is only 
about two-thirds of the mean standard deviation of monthly changes, which is only just 
less than the mean root mean square monthly change, but the standard deviation of the 
level is about three times as large as these last two.  The coefficient of variation is about 
one for most measures, but more like 0.7 for the mean absolute monthly change.  Because 
volatilities cannot be negative, there is a significant positive skew, as indicated by the   14
relative distances from the mean of the maximum and minimum.  The average episode is 
18.4 quarters in length, with a standard deviation of 5.9. 
 
Table 2.  Some Basic Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  St. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Real exchange rate volatility measures 
Mean absolute change 
(MAC) 
1.43 1.06  0.37  7.86 
St. dev. of change (SDC)  2.16  2.31  0.49  22.31 
Root mean sq. change 
(RMSC) 
2.22 2.34  0.50  22.43 
St. dev. of level (SDL)  6.45  5.60  0.98  43.27 
Other variables 
Length of episode 
(quarters) 
18.41 5.89  4  30 
ln per capita GDP (2000 
$US) 
8.19 1.60  4.45  10.52 
Openness (trade/GDP)  0.618  0.225  0.187  1.332 
Monthly CPI inflation  0.61  0.60  -0.03  2.76 
Terms-of-trade volatility  8.41  8.96  0.04  51.0 
Notes.  These statistics refer to the 274 episodes of minimum length four quarters for which real effective 
exchange rate data exist, and with mean inflation below 0.03.  Inflation is the month-to-month change in 
the logarithm of the consumer price index multiplied by 100.  Terms-of-trade volatility is the standard 
deviation of the logarithm over five years centred on the mid-point of the episode, multiplied by 100.  
Terms of trade are calculated as (exports at current prices)/(exports at constant prices) divided by (imports 
at current prices)/(imports at current prices), or where this is not available as export unit values divided by 
import unit values, as given in World Development Indicators. 
 
 
The correlations between the different volatility measures are given in Table 3.  All the 
correlations are above 0.75, with that between the mean absolute change and the standard 
deviation of the level being the lowest.  The correlation between the standard deviation of 
the change and the root mean square change is very close to one, which indicates that 
drift is not a major factor. 
   15
 
Table 3.  Correlations Between Alternative Volatility Measures 
 
 MAC  SDC  RMSC 
MAC 1     
SDC 0.886 1   
RMSC 0.896  0.998  1 
SDL 0.777  0.805  0.813 
Notes.  These statistics refer to the 274 episodes of minimum length four quarters with mean inflation 
below 0.03.   For definitions see equation (1). 
 
   
Table 4 shows some basic statistics by regime.  The two smallest categories (currency 
boards (2) and crawling bands (6)) have been amalgamated with a neighbouring category 
(no separate legal tender (1) and crawling pegs (5) respectively), but otherwise no regime 
represents more than 21% of the observations.  Real exchange rate volatility tends to be 
highest under floats (with little difference between managed and independent floats), and 
lowest under some intermediate regimes (pegs with wide bands (4) and crawls (5 and 6)). 
Alternative volatility measures (not shown in the table) display a similar pattern. Inflation 
is distinctly higher in crawls and managed floats, and these regimes are more common in 
poorer countries.  There is a slight tendency for openness to decline with regime 
flexibility, since larger countries tend to have more flexible regimes (Bleaney and 
Francisco, 2008).  Somewhat surprisingly, the least flexible regimes tend to be associated 
with higher terms-of-trade volatility.   16
 
Table 4.   Basic Statistics by Exchange Rate Regime 
 













1 /2  45  6.78  0.315  8.02  0.675  11.90 
3 54  6.17  0.381  8.13  0.710  11.89 
4  32  3.43  0.381 9.64 0.649 9.55 
5/6  38  4.91  0.992 7.86 0.537 6.63 
7  55  7.76  0.917 7.40 0.625 8.79 
8  50  8.10  0.462 8.59 0.501 6.35 
           
All  274  6.45  0.608 8.19 0.618 8.41 
Notes.  These statistics refer to episodes of minimum length four quarters with mean inflation below 0.03.   
For definitions of regimes see Table 1. For definitions of variables see Table 2. 
 
 
6.  Empirical Results 
In this section we develop an empirical model of real effective exchange rate volatility.  
First we consider per capita GDP, trade openness, terms-of-trade volatility and inflation.  
We also control for episode length, which is significant for one volatility measure.   Then 
we introduce dummies for different exchange rate regimes (treating a conventional peg as 
the omitted category), and finally we allow for the inflation effect to vary with the 
exchange rate regime.  Thus the model is: 
 
it it it it it it it u INF ERR e dERR cX bINF a RVOL + + + + + = ) * (   (6) 
   17
where  it RVOL  is the volatility of the real effective exchange rate in episode t in country i; 
INF is the inflation rate; X is a vector of other exogenous variables (e.g.  openness); ERR 
is a vector of exchange rate regime dummies; and u  is a stochastic term. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for the basic model without regime effects or interaction terms.  
Unless otherwise stated, all the regressions presented omit episodes shorter than four 
quarters in length and with monthly inflation greater than three percentage points.  The 
model explains 30% to 40% of observed volatility.   Volatility increases significantly 
with the length of the episode for the SDL measure only, which is not surprising because 
MAC and RMSC are calculated using changes rather than levels.  Volatility decreases 
with per capita GDP and openness, and increases with inflation and terms-of-trade 
volatility.  In terms of the effect of an increase of one standard deviation (i.e. multiplying 
the coefficients in Table 5 by the standard deviations in Table 2), inflation is the most 
important factor.  The second most important factor is terms-of-trade volatility.   
Openness lags some way behind: for all volatility measures, a one-S.D. change has only 
about a third of the effect of a one-S.D. change in the inflation rate.  As the last row of 
Table 5 indicates, four other geographical variables (land area, population density, GDP-
weighted distance from other countries and a dummy for landlockedness) were 
collectively (and also individually) insignificant except in the case of SDL, and were 
omitted from the model.  All of these variables tend to be correlated with openness, so 
this implies that openness is a sufficient variable to capture the effects of geography.
8 
   18
 
Table 5.  An Initial Regression for Real Effective Exchange Rate Volatility 
 
  Volatility Measure 
 MAC  RMSC  SDL 







































      
Observations 274  274  274 
R-squared 0.416  0.317  0.341 
Standard error  0.821  1.96  4.59 
F-statistic (4, 264)  0.98 (p=0.419) 1.76  (p=0.137) 3.00*(p=0.019) 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The F-statistic refers to 
a joint test of zero coefficients on four omitted geographical variables: land area, population density, GDP-
weighted average distance from other countries (all in logs), and a dummy for landlockedness. 
 
 
There is a possible concern that these results are unduly influenced by the inequality in 
episode lengths (and the consequent overrepresentation of countries with more regime 
changes), or by the particular choice of threshold for excluding high-inflation episodes.  
Accordingly Table 6 shows regressions similar to that in Table 5 for the SDL measure 
except with different inflation thresholds, but keeping the minimum episode length at 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
8 In the SDL regression, land area is significant, and when it is included, openness becomes insignificant.  For 
simplicity, however, we keep the same specification for SDL as for the other two volatility measures.   19
four quarters, and Table 7 shows regressions with longer minimum episode lengths.   In 
neither case do the results vary much from those in Table 5 (the same is also true for 
other volatility measures, although the results are not shown). 
 
 
Table 6.   Samples with Different Upper Limits for Inflation 
 
  Volatility Measure 
 SDL  SDL  SDL 
 
SDL 
Including obs. with 
mean monthly 
inflation up to: 
2.00  3.00  4.00 5.00 



















































       
Observations 261  274  278 285 
R-squared 0.359  0.341  0.342 0.362 
Standard error  4.45  4.59  4.67 4.78 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). 
Minimum episode length four quarters.  The regression from Table 5 is italicized.   20
Table 7.    Samples with Different Minimum Episode Lengths 
 
  Volatility Measure 





4  8 12  16 
Independent variables        


















































        
Observations  274  252 234  215 
R-squared  0.341  0.364 0.346  0.400 
Standard error  4.59  4.50 4.62  4.09 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1).  Sample 




6.1   Regime Effects 
We turn now to exchange rate regime effects.  Does the inclusion of regime dummies 
improve on the model shown in Table 5?  As well as including a dummy for each regime 
(as aggregated in Table 4, and using a conventional peg to a single currency as the 
omitted category), we also allow pegs to a basket of currencies to be different from pegs 
to a single currency, since they may help to stabilise the real effective exchange rate. 
   21
Table 8 shows the OLS results.  Although altogether six regime dummies were added to 
the regression, those for four of them (those for a hard peg, a basket peg, a conventional 
band and a managed float) are consistently insignificant.  Crawling pegs and bands have a 
significant negative coefficient and independent floats a significantly positive one.  Thus 
crawling pegs and bands seem to reduce volatility at a given inflation rate, while an 
independent float increases it, relative to a conventional peg.   On the other hand, a 
managed float does not, despite the high average volatility under managed floats shown 
in Table 4.  This is because the model is already explaining this feature by inflation, 
which is relatively high under managed floats. 
 
There is a concern that these results are unduly sensitive to outliers.  To address this, we 
have re-estimated the equation using robust regression techniques (Table 9).  Table 9 
shows that these concerns are justified, both because of the substantial number of outliers 
identified (as indicated at the foot of Table 9) and because they are all in the upper tail, 
reflecting the positive skewness in the data.  Moreover the results for exchange rate 
regimes are somewhat different in Table 9, compared with Table 8.   The crawl dummy is 
still negative but only significant in one out of three cases.  Hard pegs also have a 
negative coefficient that is significant in one case.  Managed floats now have a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 0.01 level in two cases.  The most noticeable feature is 
that independent floats now have a highly significant positive coefficient. 
 
 
   22
 
Table 8.  Adding Exchange Rate Regime Dummies 
 
  Volatility Measure 
 MAC  RMSC  SDL 







































Regime dummies     






































      
Observations 274  274  274 
R-squared 0.540  0.387  0.403 
Standard error  0.737  1.87  4.42 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The omitted regime 
category is a conventional single-currency peg.   23
Table 9.  Adding Exchange Rate Regime Dummies (Downweighting Outliers) 
 
  Volatility Measure 
 MAC  RMSC  SDL 







































Regime dummies     






































      
Observations 274  274  274 
With zero weight  8  18  14 
0 < weight < 0.25  6  9  10 
Mean weight  0.871  0.842  0.835 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The estimation method 
is the Stata “rreg” command, which uses weighted least squares, with weights based on the absolute size of 
the residual, after omitting all observations for which Cook’s distance exceeds one.  The omitted regime 
category is a conventional single-currency peg.  24
 
Table 10.  Using Logarithmic Volatility Measures 
 
  Volatility Measure 
  ln (MAC)  ln (RMSC)  ln (SDL) 







































Regime dummies     






































      
Observations 274  274  274 
R-squared 0.640  0.568  0.465 
Standard error  0.359  0.457  0.526 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The omitted regime 
category is a conventional single-currency peg. 
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To address this issue we take logarithms of the volatility measures.  As well as reducing 
skewness, this greatly reduces the outlier problem, and makes the robust regression 
results (not shown for this case) much more similar to the OLS results.  It also has the 
advantage that the coefficients of the regime dummies now represent estimated 
proportional effects, which makes them comparable across volatility measures.  The 
results with logarithmic volatility measures appear in Table 10.  The regressions are 
pretty similar across measures, with per capita GDP, terms-of-trade volatility and 
inflation much the most significant variables.  Openness is significant only at the 0.05 
level, and as before episode length matters only for the levels measure (SDL).  Relative to 
a conventional single-currency peg (the omitted category), independent floats are 
estimated to increase volatility by about 75 (=e
0.56) %, using either MAC or RMSC, and 
crawls to reduce it by an insignificant 15-20 %.  Using SDL, the independent float effect 
is estimated as +48 (=e
0.39) %, and the crawl effect at a significant −29 (=e
−0.35) %.  All of 
the regime dummies are less positive (or more negative) using SDL, which indicates that 
volatility is estimated to be higher in the omitted category of conventional pegs (relative 
to other categories) using this measure.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the inflation effect on real exchange rate volatility may be stronger 
under a peg (other than a crawl, which is explicitly designed to adjust for relative 
inflation rates).  To test this, we now allow the inflation effect to be different for regime 
categories 1 to 4 (horizontal pegs and bands) relative to categories 5 to 8 (crawls and 
floats), by including an additional variable that is equal to the inflation rate for regimes 1   26
to 4, and equal to zero for regimes 5 to 8.  The results are shown in Table 11.   The new 
variable is always significantly positive at the 0.05 level, and with a coefficient similar to 
that of the inflation rate, which implies that the inflation effect is approximately twice as 
strong under a peg.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that there are political costs to 
adjusting a peg. 
 
The coefficients of the regime dummies have a different interpretation in Table 11 from 
in previous tables.  For crawling pegs and bands and for floats, they now indicate only the 
estimated effect relative to a single-currency peg at a zero inflation rate.  To calculate the 
regime effect at any positive inflation rate, the impact of the coefficient of the inflation 
rate times the dummy for regime 1 to 4 must also be taken into account.  Crawling pegs 
and bands are now estimated to have no effect on volatility relative to a single-currency 
peg at zero inflation, which makes sense, while independent floats add 71 (= e
0.54) to 112 
(= e
0.75) % to volatility at zero inflation, and managed floats add 25 to 51 %, depending 
on which volatility measure is used.  At a monthly inflation rate of 0.01, however, 
crawling pegs and bands would reduce inflation significantly; managed floats would 
make little difference; and independent floats would increase volatility but by 
substantially less than at zero inflation.
9 
 
                                                           
9 This can be seen by subtracting 0.01 times the coefficient of (inflation times regime 1 to 4 dummy) from the 
coefficient of the dummy for the relevant exchange rate regime.   27
Table 11.  Allowing for Regime-Specific Inflation Effects 
 
  Volatility Measure 
  ln (MAC)  ln (RMSC)  ln (SDL) 















































Regime dummies     






































      
Observations 274  274  274 
R-squared 0.653  0.541  0.477 
Standard error  0.353  0.471  0.521 
Chow stat. F(9, 256)  0.63  0.49  0.46 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The omitted regime 
category is a conventional single-currency peg.  The Chow statistic refers to the hypothesis that the 
coefficients are identical between advanced and developing countries, and for enhanced power is based on 
a regression with only two regime dummies (managed and independent float).  The 0.05 critical value is 
1.89. 
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This sheds a new light on the phenomenon of “fear of floating”, or the tendency for floats 
to be managed in the developing world (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).   This has been 
widely interpreted, as the phrase implies, to mean that countries are intellectually 
convinced of the merits of an independent float but unwilling in practice to accept the 
resulting real exchange rate volatility.  The results obtained here suggest an alternative 
interpretation: managed floats are adopted not out of any intellectual enthusiasm for 
floating but for the pragmatic reason that they are a more effective way of controlling real 
exchange rate volatility in the presence of significant inflation, given the reluctance to 
adjust the parity under a peg.  This is consistent with the statistical association of 
managed floats with relatively high inflation rates, as shown in Table 4. 
 
The Chow statistics at the foot of Table 11 show that there is no significant difference in 
coefficients between developing countries (199 observations) and advanced countries (75 
observations).  It is interesting, therefore, to use these regressions to examine the 
contribution of each variable to the model’s “explanation” of the much higher average 
volatility in developing countries.  Table 12 shows that the observed average difference is 
rather smaller (although still substantial) using the standard deviation of the real 
exchange rate level rather than changes.  About half of this average difference is 
explained by factors other than per capita GDP (which might be interpreted as the 
element the model has failed to explain), mainly inflation and terms-of-trade volatility. 
Developing countries’ choice of exchange rate regime (principally a much lower 
frequency of independent floats) has helped to reduce volatility.   29
Table 12.  Explaining Higher Volatility in Developing Countries 
 
Average difference between 
developing and advanced  
countries 
Volatility Measure 
  ln (MAC)  ln (RMSC)  ln (SDL) 
      
Observed +0.51  +0.59  +0.38 
Explained by:      
Episode length  -0.01  -0.01  -0.07 
Per capita GDP  +0.25  +0.31  +0.22 
Openness -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
TOT volatility  +0.14  +0.16  +0.18 
Inflation +0.16  +0.17  +0.21 
Inflation x peg dummy  +0.03  +0.04  +0.03 
Managed float dummy  +0.07  +0.08  +0.05 
Independent float dummy  -0.17  -0.18  -0.13 
Notes.  The Table shows the difference in mean values of each variable between developing and advanced 
countries, multiplied by the coefficients of the relevant regression in Table 11. 
 
 
6.2  Further hypotheses 
In this section we consider three further hypotheses.  The first is that capital controls 
reduce volatility by inhibiting speculative capital flows (as is intended in Chile, for 
example).  To test this we introduce a dummy for the existence of controls on capital 
transactions, as reported in the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions.  Secondly we test whether inflation targeting reduces real 
effective exchange rate volatility relative to what would be expected, given that it tends to 
be associated with floating rates, as is suggested by the results of Rose (2007) for a more 
limited sample.  For this we use a dummy for an inflation targeting regime, based on the 
data in Rose (2007, Table A1).  Finally we test whether financial development, as 
measured by the log of one plus the ratio of M3 to GDP, reduces volatility, as found by   30
Devereux and Lane (2003). Table 13 shows the effects of adding these two variables to 
the regressions shown in Table 11. 
 
In Table 13, the four insignificant regime dummies (hard peg, basket peg, conventional 
band and crawling peg and band) have been omitted.  Since they tended to have negative 
coefficients, their omission makes the dummies for managed and independent floats more 
positive and more significant. 
 
Capital controls have a consistently positive coefficient, contrary to the view that they 
reduce volatility, although it is never statistically significant.  The most likely explanation 
for this is reverse causality – that countries with naturally greater real exchange rate 
volatility are more tempted to impose capital controls in an attempt to reduce it.  The fact 
that the estimated coefficient is positive shows that any effect of controls in reducing 
volatility is either negligible or too small to outweigh this selection effect. 
 
The inflation targeting dummy is also insignificant in all three cases, and (perhaps 
surprisingly) positive. The difference between this result and that of Rose (2007) is 
probably explained by the fact that we control for the inflation effect.  Since inflation 
targeting reduces inflation, it will tend to reduce real exchange rate volatility through this 
mechanism. 
 
Although the financial development variable always has a negative coefficient, as 
expected, it also is never statistically significant.   31
Table 13.  Capital Controls, Inflation Targeting and Financial Development 
 
  Volatility Measure 
  ln (MAC)  ln (RMSC)  ln (SDL) 















































Regime dummies     





































      
Observations 271  271  271 
R-squared 0.657  0.596  0.476 
Standard error  0.352  0.444  0.522 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level.   For definition of volatility measures see equation (1). Sample 
excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with monthly inflation > 0.03.  The omitted regime 
category is a conventional single-currency peg.   32
 
6.3 Sample  selection  bias 
There is a possibility that the results are subject to sample selection bias, because real 
effective exchange rate indices are not available for many countries.  To test for this, we 
have constructed measures of the standard deviation of the level of the real bilateral 
exchange rate against the US dollar, using consumer price indices.  This expands the 
sample to 154 countries and 493 episodes.  We estimate a regression for the log of 
bilateral real exchange rate volatility that is identical in structure to that in Table 11, 
except that we also include a dummy for attachment to a currency that has floated against 
the US dollar (this dummy is equal to one for all countries in Europe and North Africa 
that are on a peg, and for countries pegged to the South African rand).  We then re-
estimate this regression for countries with and without real effective exchange rate data, 
and calculate the Chow statistic.  The results are shown in Table 14.  Since the Chow 




                                                           
10 The coefficients are a bit different in some cases for real bilateral rates, but that is an issue for another paper.   33
Table 14.  Testing for Sample Selection Bias 
 
  Dependent variable: ln (standard deviation of the US$ 
bilateral real exchange rate) 



























































Regime dummies     






































Observations 493  267  221 
R-squared 0.378  0.390  0.399 
Standard error  0.658  0.648  0.672 
Chow stat. F(14, 465)    0.88 
Notes.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics.  * (**) denotes significantly 
different from zero at the 0.05 (0.01) level. Sample excludes all episodes shorter than four quarters and with 
monthly inflation > 0.03.  The omitted regime category is a conventional single-currency peg.  The 0.05 
critical value of the Chow statistic is 1.70.   34
7.  Conclusions 
This paper has presented a new analysis of real effective exchange rate volatility, using a 
sample of 90 countries.  After controlling for other factors, volatility is higher in poorer 
countries and those with more terms-of-trade volatility.  Volatility increases markedly 
with the inflation rate, even at moderate levels (observations with inflation above three 
per cent per month were excluded throughout). The inflation effect is stronger in pegged 
regimes, which is consistent with the view that adjusting a peg is costly.   Inflationary 
problems and greater terms-of-trade volatility explain about half of the 40-60 % higher 
volatility in developing countries in this sample.  Geographical factors, as reflected in the 
ratio of international trade to GDP, are marginally significant but of minor importance 
relative to inflation, terms-of-trade volatility and per capita GDP. 
 
The choice of exchange rate regime can make a substantial difference to real effective 
exchange rate volatility over and above these effects.  At average inflation rates, an 
independent float adds about 48 % to volatility (measured as the standard deviation of the 
level), or alternatively about 75 % (using measures based on monthly changes) relative to 
a conventional peg.  A crawling peg or band tends to reduce volatility by about 20 % (but 
to a statistically significant degree only for one out of three measures).  Crawls seem to 
represent the closest approximation to a regime of real exchange rate targeting.  Real 
exchange rate volatility under other regimes is not significantly different from under a 
conventional peg: for instance there is no evidence that basket pegs deliver significantly 
lower real effective exchange rate volatility than single-currency pegs, even though they   35
might be expected to do so, since the basket is usually a better reflection of a country’s 
trade pattern. 
 
Under less flexible regimes, real effective exchange rate volatility is significantly more 
sensitive to inflation than under more flexible regimes.  This probably reflects a 
reluctance to adjust the parity to offset inflation differentials, either through inertia or 
because of perceived political costs. Managed floats are better than conventional pegs at 
delivering lower real exchange rate volatility at higher inflation rates, and it is noticeable 
that managed floats are more frequently observed in higher-inflation situations.   This 
suggests that managed floats are adopted more out of pragmatic considerations than out 
of an intellectual conviction of the merits of floating. They probably represent a 
“reluctance to peg” in inflationary situations more than a “fear of floating”. 
 
We found no evidence that capital controls or inflation targeting reduce exchange rate 
volatility.  Finally, although real effective exchange rate data are absent for many 
countries, estimation of a similar equation using bilateral real exchange rate volatility 
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Countries in the sample 
 
Industrial countries (23) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
 
Developing Countries (67) 
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bolivia, Bulgaria, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo,  Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guyana, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Moldova, Morocco, 
Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Solomon 
Islands, South Africa, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Zambia. 